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ABSTRACT  
Web application firewalls (WAF) have been proven to be a useful tool in a much needed 
security for internet applications. Automation of ruleset development for WAF may reduce 
human errors and establish required baseline for web security. This research paper shows that 
mechanical implementation of highest paranoia levels on WAF may severely affect the 
productivity of the system and calls for the need for human intervention to critically review the 
proposed ruleset and find the optimal paranoia level that suits specific web application.  
Keywords: firewall automation; network security; web application firewalls; paranoia 
levels, ruleset. 
INTRODUCTION 
Web-based applications have completely revolutionized the face of communication. The 
readiness, the increased online-based businesses and services, the increased need for information, 
and the reachability of web services have collectively increased efficiency and operational 
productivities in society. However, with these increases, there is a call for a greater need of 
information protection. Use of web applications has enabled a completely new environment of 
vulnerabilities and exploits such as SQL injection, Cross-site scripting (XSS) and many more.  
The escalation in breaches and the complexity of attacks and services necessitates 
supplementary functionality beyond the capability of dated network-based security products. The 
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integration of web application security offers a complete solution to help decrease threats 
associated with the security of web-based services 
This paper will review the fundamental functionality of ModSecurity and the factors that 
affect it’s performance such as Paranoia Levels (PL). Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) 
became a vital staple as a layer of protection for online systems from nefarious actors. The 
effectiveness of a firewall is linked to the firewall’s response time and its performance while 
under duress. ModSecurity, a WAF is an open source web application used for monitoring, 
logging and granting or denying access to web-based application. WAF setup and maintenance 
requires intensive human intervention which makes it prone to human errors. There is an 
ongoing effort from the information security community to automate WAF configuration to 
ensure security baseline while reducing negative effects of the human factors.  
The goal of this research is to examine the behavior of ModSecurity configured with the 
latest Core Rule Set (CRS) v3.2 recommended by OWASP  (Folini, 2019) to determine the 
firewall’s performance measured by its effectiveness and throughput. Two hypotheses (H1 and 
H2) will be tested in this research. H1 assumes that PL affects the detection ratio and 
performance of WAF. H2 assumes that ModSecurity is still useful while configured at the 
maximum paranoia level (PL4).  
LITERATURE REVIEW   
Over the last two decades significant number of research projects looked at Web 
Application Firewalls and how to configure them to guard systems against nefarious actors. One 
of the goals of this effort from the InfoSec community is to reduce the human factor and have 
universal approach to establish web application security baseline. According to  two web articles, 
(OWASP top 10 web app, 2019 and  Vulnerabilities, 2020), it is clear, that even with so many 
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efforts, such attacks as SQLi remain the leading threat in web based attacks. The related papers 
in the literature review showcase numerous ways and techniques that can be deployed to combat 
web based attacks, still, OWASP Top Ten vulnerability list remains the same, yearly and Core 
Rule Set (CRS) version keeps getting updated to better fine-tune ModSecurity and other firewall 
appliances that rely on those CRS. Subsequently, there is still a need for more work to 
thoroughly test ModSecurity’s effectiveness and throughput with recommended security 
baselines.  
Ali et al., carried out an experimental analysis on WAFs to detect Cross-Site Scripting 
and Injection attack (Ali et al. ). The research analyzed the behavior of four WAF namely; 
ModSec, Sophos, AQTRONIX, and Barracuda to determine detection capabilities. Although all 
products were able to sustain some attacks, the researchers were able to inject several payloads 
using various scanners without customizing the attacks, yet, the firewall did not trigger an alarm. 
These experiments show that out of box vendor solutions needs fine tuning by experienced 
administrators and thus rely on human expertise that may not always robust and readily 
available. While Ali et al., focused on analyzing how WAF can detect cross-site scripting (XSS) 
and injection attacks, Tekerek et al., conducted an experimental development analysis of a 
Hybrid Web Application Firewall (Tekerek et al. 2014). After the developments of a hybrid 
approach, it was observed that while signature based detection works faster in detecting certain 
attacks, it is useless against zero-day attacks. It was concluded that by combining both Anomaly-
Based Detection and Signature-Based Detection, they would be more effective in prevention 
against SQLi and zero-day attacks.  
Jagraj et al. conducted research to determine the impact paranoia levels have on the 
effectiveness of ModSecurity WAF (Jagraj et al. 2018). Tests were performed on ModSecurity 
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with CRS v3.0 to analyze how the firewall will behave at all four paranoia levels. At PL1, higher 
number of attacks were able to bypass the firewall. Additionally, PLs were increased to 
determine the number of false positives that would be logged, and it was observed that legitimate 
users were not able to register on the website at the maximum PL4 configuration. The study was 
indicative that PL, if improperly implemented, my severely affect the usability of the web 
application. The experiment done by Oberoi et al. started out by configuring ModSecurity with 
and without CRS, then by running multiple tests, were able to determine the change in response 
time of the firewall. According to the obtained results, the increase in CRS drastically decreased 
the firewall’s performance in serving requests (Oberoi, Samuel and Zarvarsky 2018).  
The essence of the proposed research is to explore questions that have been left open by 
research papers reviewed above. Even though Ali et al. (Ali et al.) looked at multiple firewalls to 
determine each firewall’s performance in detecting payloads of Cross-site scripting and Injection 
attacks and (Tekerek et al. 2014) (Jagraj et al. 2018) (Oberoi, Samuel, and Zarvarsk 2018) all 
focused on other techniques to detect, block and log SQLi attacks, the researchers did not 
analyze how the paranoia level affects the firewall performance in terms of detection efficiency 
and negative impact on application usability. There are still areas that requires development for 
the effects of paranoia levels on throughput and effectiveness and with that, this research aims to 
analyze the behavior of ModSecurity latest CRS to determine what rules are being triggered at 
each of the four PL(1-4) and how the firewall performs at each level while under duress by the 
performance tool, Siege. It is important to note that web application security appliances will 
never replace security professionals. Out of the box, ModSecurity CRS is configured at PL1 and 
therefore, the firewall is performing below average. For the firewall to be efficient and effective, 
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both software and human intervention is required to fine tune the application to meet 
organization’s business objectives, requirement and goals.  
The performance of the firewall will be analyzed using a popular automation benchmark 
tool known as Siege. Knowing how the firewall performs at each of the PL, will provide 
guidance for security professionals responsible for reviewing and updating CRS, to adjust how 
traffic is monitored and how rules are triggered, which will improve how quickly attacks are 
blocked and logged, improve data transmission to legitimate users and how responsive the web 
application is while multiple users access the web services.  
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF WAF AND PARANOIA LEVELS 
In this section, the focus will be on devising the methodology structure and answering 
questions on how PL affects the performance of the firewall with the help of experimental results 
obtained from this research. The steps involved in carrying out the experiment is delineated 
below: 
Methodology and Lab Description 
The two hypotheses that will be tested in this research are as follows: 
H1. PL affects the detection ratio and performance of WAF. 
H2. ModSecurity is still useful while configured at the maximum level, PL4.  
The following steps have been done to test both hypotheses: (1) Setup testbed conducive 
for network monitoring and attack simulation. (2)  ModSecurity configured to detect usage on 
the web application. To determine its effectiveness and throughput a benchmark performance 
tool known as Siege, will be utilized. ModSecurity will be configured with PLs ranging from 
PL1 to PL4 and its performance will also be analyzed using Siege.  
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Figure 1. Network design setup for conducting experiments for firewall performance 
analysis 
The network diagram on Figure 1 depicts a simulation of the setup where the attacker or 
user(s) sends HTTP requests to the DVWA. The DVWA (EthicalHacker, 2020), is setup to act as 
the test application having vulnerable codes that can be exploited using several types of attacks 
including SQL injection and cross-site scripting. ModSecurity, which is acting as the firewall, is 
configured in Embedded mode for the web service. Configuring it as such limits new points of 
failure and scales seamlessly as the underlying web infrastructure scales. The firewall is 
configured at varying Paranoia Levels (1-4) and will either block or allow the traffic to pass to 
the DVWA database and each action is logged in the firewall’s logfile. The performance tool, 
Siege will be utilized to analyze the firewalls behavior and performance while the firewall is 
configured at the vary paranoia levels (PL1-PL4). 
Experimental Results and Analysis 
To test ModSecurity, a performance tool known as Siege was used to give an overview of 
how the firewall performs under duress. The tool works by simulating hits to the web server with 
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concurrent connections from virtual users. Simulation for each paranoia level was done with 10, 
20, 30, 40 and 50 concurrent users. It can be observed from the results that for PL2 to PL4 the 
application server’s availability was affected by the change in the paranoia level setting, while at 
PL1 the server’s availability remained at full capacity.  Availability is calculated by the 
percentage of socket connections successfully handled by the server. It can be seen from tables 3 
and 4 that under PL3 and PL 4 servers availability went below 98% which is not acceptable for a 
typical e-commerce application. Another critical indicator – response time went up to almost 2 
seconds with PL4 under a mild workload of 10 concurrent users and went to unacceptable time 
of 8.20 seconds for highly loaded situations with PL4. Although the poor response time could be 
addressed by vertical or horizontal scaling of the server setup, the same scaling would be 
required for WAF as well, thus significantly increasing demand for resources.  
The results also indicate that concurrency increases as the server’s performance 
decreases. Concurrency can be calculated by the average of all simulated users divided by the 
elapse time. Table 1 with PL1 has the least amount of concurrent value of 11.3 at a workload of 
10 concurrent users and PL4 shows a significant increase of 22.1 under the same workload of 10 
concurrent users. Such results are deemed unacceptable for a typical e-commerce application 
because at PL4, 50 concurrent users are all it takes to render the system ineffective.  
Hypothesis H1 was clearly proven by the decrease of the performance for the same 
workload under the same PL. Reduction in availability and throughput as well as increase of 
elapse and response times between PL1 and PL4 are visible in the Appendix 1. 
H2 looked at the usability issues as time is a precious commodity and response time 
delays in using web services and applications take users away from a service (Dennis and Taylor 
2005). According to table 4 in Appendix A, PL4 was configured on the firewall and the 
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performance was drastically impacted, even at the lowest concurrency level with 10 users, c10. 
The higher the PL, the more rules become active which means all HTTP packets are checked 
against each criteria/ rule that are defined, placing enormous pressure on the firewall, thus 
resulting in delays, dropped packets or even false positive. In the paper published by ((Dennis 
and Taylor 2005) reasonable response time is 2 s and is considered “short”, while 10 s is 
considered “long”. ” and if the application is not vital to users’ needs, it may be seen marginal in 
terms of acceptability. Another workload indicator – Availability dropped from 100% to 88% 
which is not acceptable for generic e-commerce applications. Although the availability issue can 
be addressed with the horizontal or vertical scaling of the infrastructure, under the current testbed 
settings H2 needs to be rejected. A paper published by (Sobola, Zavarsky and Butakov, 2020) 
mentioned the use of a use case by Trustwave Holdings Inc (SpiderLabs, 2020) where it 
introduced strict profile checks using postive or negative security model. However, (Sobola, 
Zavarsky and Butakov, 2020) recommended bridging the gap between positive and negative 
security models that may improve performance for the web application. This approach could be 
an interesting research to be undertaken in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Conducted experiment indicated that basic introduction of the rulesets configured as per 
highest paranoia level can severely affect the performance of the web application. With each 
paranoia level setting that was tested, different rulesets were activated. Each HTTP packet goes 
through rigorous scans to ensure it should be allowed or be denied and the more rules that are 
enabled at each paranoia level, the harder the firewall must perform to scan each HTTP packet. 
With that, the future of this research would be to analyze the rulesets for each of the different 
paranoia levels that were activated, and provide this data to administrators who are responsible 
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for writing and testing those rulesets to review and make changes where necessary to improve 
the performance of ModSecurity, therefore,  a semi-supervised simulation of the ruleset would 
be idealistic.  
Additionally, the rulesets were written by humans, therefore, it can be assumed that 
human-errors were introduced in the rulesets which may have resulted in the experimental 
outcome as outlined in the appendix section of this research, therefore, the future direction of this 
research may seek to investigate whether there are certain biases or error that people may have 
introduced in each paranoia level rulesets.  
This research is the first step in the study that aims to finding a solution to achieve a 
balance between standardization of the rulesets in web application firewalls and human 
intervention required to finetune rulesets for specific applications.  
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APPENDIX A:  
PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF MODSECURITY USING SIEGE PERFORMANCE 
TOOL WHILE FIREWALL IS SET AT PL1 to PL4. C= Concurrent Users 
Table 1. Firewall performance at PL1 
Performance characteristics C10 C20 C30 C40 C50 
Transaction 800 1600 2400 3200 4000 
Availability 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Elapsed time (sec) 1.03 2.09 3.19 4.29 5.50 
Data transferred (mb) 138.54 127.89 122.84 105.75 94.82 
Response time(sec) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.31 
Transaction rate (Tans/sec) 776.7 765.6 752.4 745.9 725.3 
Throughput (mb/sec) 2.67 2.42 2.30 2.18 2.08 
Concurrency 11.3 16.9 20.6 24.5 29.1 
 
Table 2. Firewall performance at PL2 
Performance characteristics C10 C20 C30 C40 C50 
Transaction 800 1600 2400 3200 4000 
Availability 100% 100% 99.94% 99.54% 99.12% 
Elapsed time (sec) 1.11 2.23 3.44 4.89 6.52 
Data transferred (mb) 120.84 117.59 103.75 90.98 87.62 
Response time(sec) 0.09 0.10 0.12 1.95 2.03 
Transaction rate (Tans/sec) 720.7 717.5 697.7 654.4 613.5 
Throughput (mb/sec) 2.45 2.21 2.12 1.87 1.47 
Concurrency 15.1 18.3 22.7 27.8 33.9 
 
Table 3. Firewall performance at PL3 
Performance characteristics C10 C20 C30 C40 C50 
Transaction 800 1600 2400 3200 4000 
Availability 99% 98.45% 98.81% 98.27% 98% 
Elapsed time (sec) 1.35 2.75 5.23 7.3 9.42 
Data transferred (mb) 117.74 113.79 91.76 82.59 74.26 
Response time(sec) 1.08 1.30 3.02 4.10 6.02 
Transaction rate (Tans/sec) 592.6 581.8 458.9 438.4 424.6 
Throughput (mb/sec) 2.03 1.84 1.31 1.13 1.06 
Concurrency 20.9 25.5 32.50 36.9 40.3 
 
Table 4: Firewall performance at PL4.  
Performance characteristics C10 C20 C30 C40 C50 
Transaction 800 1600 2400 3200 4000 
Availability 93.10% 92% 89.11% 88.36% 88% 
Elapsed time (sec) 1.58 4.01 6.08 8.25 10.60 
Data transferred (mb) 114.94 106.89 86.82 71.72 68.74 
Response time(sec) 1.51 2.50 3.10 6.06 8.20 
Transaction rate (Tans/sec) 506.3 399 394.7 387.8 377.4 
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Throughput (mb/sec) 1.46 1.40 1.19 1.02 0.74 
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APPENDIX B:  
GRAPH OF PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF MODSECURITY USING SIEGE 
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